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a b  s  t  r a  c t
Universal  Health  Coverage  (UHC) has become  a  key  goal  of health policy in many  developing
countries.  However,  implementing  UHC  poses tough  policy choices  about:  what  treatments
to provide (the  depth  of coverage);  to what  proportion  of the  population  (the  breadth  of
coverage); at what  price to patients  (the  height  of coverage).  This paper uses  a theoretical
mathematical  programming  model to  derive  analytically the  optimal balance  between the
range  of services  provided  and  the  proportion  of  the  population covered under UHC,  using
the  general  principles of cost-effectiveness  analysis. In  contrast to  most CEA,  the  model
allows  for  variations  in  both the  costs of provision  and  the  social  benefits  of treatments,
depending  on the  deprivation  level  of the  population. We illustrate  empirically  the  optimal
trade-off  between the  size  of the  benefits package  and  the  proportion  of the  population
securing  access  to  each  treatment  for a hypothetical  East  African  country,  based  on WHO
data on the  costs and benefits  of treatments  at different coverage  levels. We  begin  with
a scenario allowing coverage  levels  to  vary,  then  apply  differential equity weights to the
benefits  of coverage, and  finally illustrate a  scenario where  interventions  are  either pro-
vided  at  95% coverage or  not  at all (as is  usually done in health  benefits package  design)
for  comparison.  The results  present the  optimal trade-off  between the  social  benefits  of
pursuing full  population coverage, at the  expense  of expanding the  benefits  package  for
‘easier  to reach’ populations.
© 2020 The Authors.  Published by  Elsevier B.V.  This  is  an  open  access article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
In many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
recent debates about health policy have focused on the
notion of Universal Health Coverage (UHC). This is  defined
by the World Health Organization as “ensuring that all
people can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabil-
itative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient
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quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of
these services does not expose the user to  financial hard-
ship” (WHO, 2018). UHC was the topic of the 2010 World
Health Report, and the subject was  given further impe-
tus by the adoption in  2012 of a United Nations General
Assembly Resolution on UHC, and its inclusion as the cen-
tral health-related feature of the Sustainable Development
Goals (United Nations, 2013; WHO, 2010, 2017).
As explained by Glassman et al. (2017),  the attraction
of UHC to policymakers is easy to understand. In principle,
it improves access to health services for many people who
would otherwise be unable to  use those services, reduces
the incidence of serious impoverishment caused by health
shocks, and, by making access to health services unrelated
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102282
0167-6296/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is  an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Three dimensions to  consider when moving towards UHC. Source:
(WHO, 2015).
to ability to pay, promotes a widely held concept of fairness.
Furthermore, it has been shown to be an efficient way  of
improving health outcomes for the population (Moreno-
Serra and Smith, 2015). Most high-income countries (HICs)
have had some form of UHC in place for several decades,
and an increasing number of LMICs are seeking to  make a
transition towards UHC.
A fundamental principle of UHC is that it should be
funded by government or  quasi-government sources (such
as mandatory social health insurance or donor funds)
(Nicholson et al., 2015). In most settings the bulk of this
funding will arise from taxes or  insurance payments by
individual citizens, which are then pooled for the purposes
of UHC. The important characteristic of whatever funding
mechanism is used is that contributions should be unre-
lated to medical risk, as indicated for example by the health
status or age of the citizen. In order for the funding pool to
be sustainable, it will also usually be the case that  contribu-
tions should be mandatory. Of course, the UHC funding pool
can be augmented by  other sources, such as donor funds or
corporate taxes. We  do not  discuss further the nature of the
funding pool, but for this paper assume it is exogenously
fixed for a given period by the government or  an analogous
national decision-making body.
Any system of UHC is  therefore constrained in  scope by
the funds available, from whatever source, which in  LMICs
are vastly inferior to those available in HICs. Whilst limited
resources do not usually compromise the principle of UHC,
they expose policymakers to some particularly tough pol-
icy choices that have largely been finessed in higher income
countries. Specifically, in implementing UHC, policymak-
ers must seek out the best use of limited funds, whilst
respecting the principles of UHC. The WHO  has charac-
terized the policy problem as a  ‘cube’, the size  of which
indicates the resources available for UHC (Fig. 1). (Strictly
speaking, because its sides are not equal, the ‘cube’ should
be referred to as a  rectangular cuboid, but that  nomen-
clature lacks the rhetorical impact of ‘cube’!). Using this
device, it is argued that the core of the decision problem
requires decisions along three dimensions:
- What treatments should be  included in  the defined pack-
age of benefits (sometimes referred to as the depth of
coverage)?
- What part of the population should enjoy access to  the
treatments (the breadth of coverage)?
- What charges should patients incur for using the UHC
treatments (the height of coverage)?
Using this representation, the UHC policy problem can
be seen as a  constrained optimization problem, in which
some concept of social welfare must be maximized sub-
ject to  the overall budget constraint represented by the
cube.  The decision variables are indicated by the three
broad dimensions of the cube. To date, most analysis and
debate has focused on optimizing the depth of coverage
(the range of treatments to which beneficiaries are enti-
tled) (Glassman et al., 2017). The creation of such a  health
benefits package is a  fundamental requirement for effec-
tive implementation of UHC. However, UHC policy should
be viewed alongside the other two dimensions of the cube.
As a  first step, we offer an approach towards informing pol-
icy on the breadth of the population to be covered by UHC,
as well as the range of services.
Jamison et al. (2013) have argued for fully covering a
limited range of treatments, particularly targeted toward
the poor. However, in practice, most implementation of
UHC has failed to secure 100% of population coverage for
many of the treatments that are purportedly within the
UHC  benefits package (Nicholson et al., 2015; Somanathan
et al., 2014).  This shortfall in access leaves funds available
to increase the range of services covered in the benefits
package for those who enjoy access, but is usually in con-
tradiction to the objective of securing ‘universal’ health
coverage for the whole population. In  short, ‘depth’ of cov-
erage is increased at the expense of ‘breadth’. This trade-off
lies at the heart of this paper. When the policy intention is in
principle to secure 100% access to the chosen treatments,
any shortfall can be thought of as being ‘unmet need’. It
may occur for a range of reasons, such as the direct and
indirect financial costs to the individual of securing access,
cultural and informational barriers to access, or simply a
failure to provide the service. It must be emphasized that
a  shortfall in access will not in general arise from delib-
erate policy to refuse treatment to certain groups. Rather,
it occurs because of such indirect influences on  access. In
this paper, we  assume that such barriers to access can be
removed, albeit at a  cost to the health system, for example
in the form of improved transport provision or introduction
of health facilities in remote rural areas.
Some countries seeking to implement UHC impose
charges on some or  all of the population for using cer-
tain treatments in the UHC benefits package. Of course, if
the charge is  as high as the prevailing market price for a
treatment, it is  effectively removed from the benefits pack-
age. However, assuming the user charge is less than the
full  market price, the treatment is partially subsidized and
can therefore be considered to be  within the benefits pack-
age. User fees increase the total funds available for UHC
by (a) reducing demand for the affected treatments and
(b) directly yielding income from patients for the health
system. However, they can compromise a  fundamental
principle of UHC by exposing the user to financial hardship,
and therefore diluting financial protection (Smith, 2005).
For completeness, we make reference to  user charges in
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the theoretical model set out below. However, because of
the complexity of specifying and enforcing user charges in
many LMIC settings, they are often not considered a viable
policy option, and so we do not incorporate them into our
core analysis.
The WHO  cube (first proposed by  Reinhard Busse and
colleagues (Busse and Schlette, 2007)) has proved an
immensely helpful device for highlighting to policymak-
ers the essential trade-offs that are made when seeking
to make a transition towards UHC (or improve the effec-
tiveness of an existing implementation). However, it is  a
conceptual device, and not a  practical tool for detailed
design of UHC. It makes no pretense to  modelling the
immense diversity of potential treatments that might be
included in a health benefits package, or  the variations
in access secured by the population entitled to  use those
treatments.
In practice, no system of UHC has been able to  respect
all the principles embodied in UHC. For  example:
- It has rarely been possible to specify fully an explicit set
of treatments to which all beneficiaries are entitled to use
(and, by implication, a  complementary set of treatments
that are excluded from the benefits package);
- It is rare to find that 100% of the population actually
secures access to all UHC services to which they are enti-
tled. Instead, to  a  greater or lesser extent, all systems of
UHC exhibit aspects of ‘unmet need’, which may arise
from financial, geographical, cultural or informational
barriers to access;
- Even within comprehensive systems of UHC, there is  con-
siderable evidence of financial hardship caused by using
health services. Several measures of ‘catastrophic’ and
‘impoverishing’ spending on health services have been
developed (Boerma et al., 2014; Wagstaff and Doorslaer,
2003; World Health Organization Regional Office for
Europe, 2017), although these generally are not able
to distinguish between spending on UHC services and
spending on other services, or  to capture the indirect
costs to patients of securing access, such as transport
costs;
- There are numerous examples of inefficiency in all health
systems (which the WHO  estimate to  be between 25% and
30% of all spending (WHO, 2010)), effectively reducing
the size of the cube available for UHC;
- The treatments delivered to patients may  not always be
delivered to the ‘acceptable’ level of quality referred to in
the WHO  definition of UHC. This has led to  development
by WHO  of the concept of ‘effective’ coverage, referring
only to that proportion of the population receiving service
of acceptable quality (Ng et al., 2014).
A variety of analytic techniques have been developed
to offer policy guidance on the effectiveness of UHC, such
as developing a  health benefits package, measuring levels
of  effective coverage, promoting financial protection, and
improving the efficiency of services. However, these have
in general been developed in  a  piecemeal fashion and not
been incorporated into a  general model of UHC optimiza-
tion.
The purpose of this paper is  to offer a first step in  the
development of a  general model for optimizing the use
of UHC funds by focusing on two of the three dimen-
sions of UHC – the trade-off between breadth and depth
of coverage. In the next section we  develop a rudimen-
tary theoretical model of UHC optimization. Based on the
theoretical model, we then make use of available data to
provide an illustration of our operational approach towards
the optimal design of the discretionary part of a UHC ben-
efits package. We then describe the data and methods
used, followed by a  discussion of the results of the illustra-
tion and their implications for understanding the trade-off
between the depth and breadth of coverage. We conclude
with a discussion of the limitations of this approach and
the opportunities offered.
A theoretical model of UHC
The approach adopted in  this paper, reflecting the for-
mulation of UHC as a  ‘cube’, is to represent the UHC design
problem as a constrained optimization. In its most general
form, we assume UHC seeks to  maximize some concept
of social welfare subject to a  fixed health system budget
constraint. A general theoretical approach towards secur-
ing an optimal trade-off between the three dimensions
of coverage is  set out in Appendix 1, adapting a  frame-
work suggested by Smith (2005,  2013). In this section, we
abstract the elements of the model relevant to  modelling
the trade-off between the breadth and depth of coverage.
We assume that the population is  heterogeneous in
some level of disadvantage y, distributed according to a
density function (y). For expository reasons, we some-
times refer to  y as ‘wealth’. However, particularly in LMICs,
disadvantage may  extend beyond conventional measures
of wealth, to include factors such as remoteness and edu-
cational opportunities. The precise definition of y  is not
material to model. We then express individual utility as
an increasing function of both health h and wealth y, and
assume that social welfare is some (possibly weighted)
aggregation of individual utility. Our general formulation
(set out fully in the appendix) then seeks to capture (a)
the health improvement aspects of UHC; (b) the finan-
cial protection function of UHC; and (c) any additional
equity objectives of UHC (beyond the redistributive mech-
anism implicit in  its design). We  assume there is a  set of
N efficient health treatments i,  each of which addresses
a discrete health problem, and creates a health benefit
for the individual of bi,  which may  be expressed in the
form of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or their dis-
ability adjusted life year (DALY) counterparts. In  the first
instance our theory assumes that bi is constant at all lev-
els of y, but this can readily be  relaxed (see below). The
costs of supplying the treatment xi(y) are assumed to  be
non-increasing in y, reflecting the additional costs often
associated with delivering effective treatments to disad-
vantaged groupsx’
i (y) ≤ 0. We also allow for the potential
in  the theoretical model for variable epidemiology of each
disease by allowing the incidence – the probability of need-
ing treatment i (y) - to vary with disadvantage. Due to data
constraints, in  our illustration below, estimates of costs and
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benefits are, however, treated as a function of coverage
level rather than wealth. Throughout we assume a  single
time period (although of course the benefits of treatment
may  extend well beyond that period) and a  fixed annual
government budget X.
On the demand side we  adopt a simple concept of
individual utility that is  linear in  health (as is  implicit in
traditional cost-effectiveness analysis) and is  separable in
h and y, such that u(h,y) =  h + v(y), where h is  the individ-
ual’s level of health and y her disadvantage. We  assume
v (.) has the usual properties v’ (.) ≥ 0 andv’’ (.) ≤ 0. When
a health shock arises, the individual is  assumed to accept
treatment if the value of the health benefits of treatment
bi exceeds the impact of its price to the individual pi, that
is bi ≥ v (y) − v (y  − pi).  Conversely, treatment is foregone
if the health benefits do not compensate for the impact of
the price of access, that is  bi ≤ v (y) − v (y − pi).  In the for-
mulation adopted in  this paper, we assume zero price for
all individuals, although we at first retain the notion of a
price to maintain consistency with the UHC cube.
In order to reflect equity concerns, a  policy weight w(y)
can be attached to a person at each level of disadvantage
y, with the assumption that this is  skewed in favour of dis-
advantaged populations, w’
i (y) ≤ 0.  Note that the use of w
(.) is equivalent to relaxing the assumption that the health
gains of treatment are  equal across all individuals. This may
be the case, for example, if more deprived populations have
access to fewer alternative treatments, rendering the treat-
ment under consideration more valuable than to  their less
deprived counterparts. We then assume that the social wel-
fare function comprises the (weighted) sum of individual




















where for each treatment there is a critical level of wealth
 (pi) at  which there is  indifference between treatment and
no treatment with price pi.  The first term in the expres-
sion is the expected health loss of those who do not  secure
access to care, and the second reflects the financial loss of
those who do use care.
The costs of providing treatment (net of any user fee







[xi(y) −  pi)]i (y) (y)dy ≤ X
There is in addition a constraint on the value each price pi
can  take, which is no greater than the market price Mi so
that 0 ≤ pi ≤ Mi. The implications for optimizing this full
model of UHC are set out in the appendix.
In this paper we consider the case in  which no user fees
can be charged. Then the policy problem is  the trade-off
between maximizing coverage and maximizing aggregate
health gain, according to the chosen social welfare function.














xi (y)i(y)(y)dy ≤  X
This expression maximizes weighted health gains subject
to the budget constraint. The decision variables zi indi-
cate the level of wealth below which treatment i cannot
be offered (because the benefits of reaching the disadvan-
taged populations are outweighed by the opportunity costs
to the rest of the health system). For interior solutions this




































= , indicating that a critical level
of wealth (and therefore coverage) for each treatment is
determined by the ratio of (equity weighted) benefits to
production costs. This is the standard cost-effectiveness
rule, except that  costs and (weighted) benefits are allowed
to vary with disadvantage. At the margin, the benefit of
further extending coverage (additional health gain, possi-
bly weighted for equity) is just offset by the marginal cost
to the health system of such extension.
In the absence of equity weights w(.), the results
are straightforward to interpret, assuming costs increase
monotonically with disadvantage. If the entire popu-
lation is  covered z∗
i
= 0,  then the condition becomes
biw (0)/xi (0) ≥ .  When none are covered by publicly
funded services, only those who  are prepared to  pay the












The introduction of equity weights (or equivalently
non-constant health benefits) renders analytic first order
conditions unhelpful from a  practical point of view, as there
may  be multiple local solutions to the optimization, and
therefore more than one value of zi*  satisfying the first
order condition. For  example, the concern with equity may
be so great that provision may  be optimal for some very
disadvantaged (high cost) groups, and also some low cost
groups, but  not for the entire population. In most circum-
stances this ‘care gap’ in  service provision between (say)
very rich and very poor people is  politically and practi-
cally infeasible. We  therefore require that  only one cut-off
wealth level can be applied. This may  mean that – for
some groups – the costs of provision exceed the benefits at
an optimal solution, as measured by a conventional cost-
effectiveness criterion, but this loss is  outweighed by the
benefits of extending provision of services to  the most dis-
advantaged, after equity concerns are taken into account.
This constrained solution concept for each treatment is
equivalent to seeking out the single level of disadvantage
z∗
i
at which the ‘net health benefit’ of implementing the
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treatment is maximized for a given , subject to all citi-
zens in the range [z∗
i
, ∞] being covered, and none in the











This expression indicates the weighted health benefits of
implementing the treatment at coverage level zi less the
health opportunity costs of implementation (calculated
with reference to  the Lagrange multiplier  from the initial
optimization). If net health benefits are positive for some
levels of disadvantage, the treatment should be imple-
mented at the coverage level z∗
i
that maximizes those
benefits. Of course, negative values of the expression at all
levels of y imply that the treatment should not  be provided
at all under UHC. Implementing this principle requires an
iterative approach to determining the optimal level of ,  as
described below.
Data
Implementation of the model requires data on the costs
and benefits for each intervention and coverage level under
consideration and the size of the patient population that
stands to benefit from each intervention. While data on
the costs and benefits of implementing an intervention for
the full population in need tends to  be readily available
from cost-effectiveness studies, costs and benefits gener-
ally assume full coverage and are rarely broken down by
coverage level. One exception is region-level data pub-
lished by WHO-CHOICE for a  limited range of treatments
at three different levels of coverage (50%, 80% and 95%)
(Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 2003).
We  use WHO-CHOICE data for 16 interventions pub-
lished for the AFR-E region1: community newborn care
package, tetanus toxoid, screening and treatment of
syphilis, normal delivery by  a  skilled attendant, manage-
ment of maternal sepsis, management of serious newborn
infections (Adam et al., 2005; WHO, 2014d); insecticide-
treated bed nets (ITN), intermittent presumptive treatment
in pregnancy (IPTP), case management with artemisinin-
based combination therapy (ACT) (Morel et al., 2005;
WHO, 2014b); measles rubella vaccine, vitamin A sup-
plementation in  pregnant women, management of severe
malnutrition (children), vitamin A supplementation in
infants and children 6–59 months, pneumonia treatment
(children), zinc (Edejer et al., 2005; WHO, 2014a);  and
treatment of new smear-positive TB cases only under DOTS
(Baltussen et al., 2005; WHO, 2014c).
The WHO-CHOICE data gives total costs and benefits
(measured in DALYs) at three levels of coverage: 50%, 80%
and 95%. We  assume constant incremental costs and ben-
efits up to 50% coverage. We then infer incremental unit
1 Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the  Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda,
United  Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
costs and benefits at additional coverage levels (55%, 60%,
65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95% and 100%) by interpo-
lation. Because WHO-CHOICE provide three data points
we are able to assess whether linearity is assumed, and
where it is not, we fit a  quadratic relationship from which
costs at intermediate coverage levels can be calculated.
(Data and details are available in  the Appendix 2.) These
approximated relationships are  differentiated with respect
to coverage to  obtain the marginal costs (2000 Int$) and
marginal benefits at 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%,
90%, 95% and 100% coverage. We then convert the costs into
2015 US$ for the AFR-E region.
In order to  calculate budget impact, data on the annual
incidence of disease is required. We  use data from the
Global Burden of Disease and Demographic and Health
Surveys Stat Compiler tool for 2015 for a representative
country in  the AFR-E region.2 Data are summarized in
Table 1,  which presents the costs and benefits by 50%, 80%
and 95% coverage and the annual incidence for a  population
of 25 million.
Methods
We  model a hypothetical health care system in  the
AFR-E region with a population of 25 million and an
assumed exogenously fixed discretionary budget of $15
million (2015 US) that may  be spent on any combination
of the 16 interventions listed above at coverage levels of
0%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95% and
100%. Interventions are assumed to be independent of each
other, while coverage levels are mutually exclusive. Note
that this budget represents only the discretionary part of
total health system spending, which is otherwise assumed
to be fixed. $15 million (2015 US) represents on average
15% of total domestic government health expenditure for
countries in  the region (World Bank Group, 2019). We  first
present a  scenario that allows coverage levels to  vary, then
extend that scenario to apply differential equity weights to
the benefits of coverage, and finally for comparison illus-
trate a  scenario where interventions are either provided at
95% coverage as documented in  the WHO-CHOICE data or
not  at all. In the scenario where differential weights are
applied, we assume for the purposes of illustration that
patients who  are the most difficult to reach are also the
poorest, and apply a  weight of 4 to the benefits in  the last
decile of coverage and a  weight of 2  to patients in the penul-
timate decile.3 These weights are of course a policy choice,
and can readily be amended.
The optimization process works by ranking intervention
coverage options by incremental cost effectiveness ratio
2 Incidence of disease and population size: Global Burden of Disease
(http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool) and percentage of women
15–49 currently pregnant: Demographic and Health Surveys Stat Com-
piler tool (https://www.statcompiler.com/en/) both accessed 01/02/2019.
3 Another method of incorporating equity is  through the use of indi-
rect equity weights or aggregate distributional cost-effectiveness analysis.
This  method requires an estimate of the health opportunity costs of
changes in health expenditure and its distribution across relevant pop-
ulation subgroups. Where the  budget is known, but opportunity costs are

























































WHO–CHOICE costs and benefits by  coverage level and patient population.
Cost per year (I$, millions) per capita DALYs averted per year per capita Incident population (2015)
Intervention 50% 80% 95% 50% 80% 95% Number Definition
Community newborn care package 0.089 0.145 0.179 0.011 0.017 0.020 27,662 Population 0–27 days of age
Tetanus toxoid 0.058 0.118 0.194 0.005 0.007 0.009 1,067,218 Population <1 year
Screening and treatment of syphilis 0.034 0.070 0.119 0.000 0.001 0.001 595,029 Percentage of women 15–49 currently
pregnant *  population female 15–49
Normal  delivery by a skilled attendant 0.157 0.259 0.334 0.004 0.007 0.008 595,029 Percentage of women 15–49 currently
pregnant *  population female 15–49
Management of maternal sepsis 0.088 0.154 0.219 0.001 0.001 0.002 70,148 Incidence of maternal sepsis and other
maternal infections
Management of serious newborn
infections
0.150 0.268 0.403 0.003 0.004 0.005 11,264 Incidence of neonatal sepsis and other
neonatal infections
Measles rubella vaccine 0.100 0.162 0.224 0.001 0.003 0.003 1,067,218 Population <1 year
Insecticide-treated bed  nets (ITN) 0.474 0.629 0.710 0.010 0.015 0.017 595,029 Percentage of women 15–49 currently
pregnant *  population female 15–49
Intermittent presumptive treatment in
pregnancy (IPTP)
0.054 0.057 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 595,029 Percentage of women 15–49 currently
pregnant *  population female 15–49
Case  management of malaria with
artemisinin-based combination
therapy (ACT)
0.192 0.203 0.211 0.009 0.015 0.017 8,375,236 Incidence of malaria
Treatment  of new smear-positive TB
cases only under DOTS
0.428 0.768 1.069 0.068 0.109 0.130 112,918 Incidence of TB
Vitamin  A supplementation in
pregnant women
0.077 0.394 0.725 0.001 0.002 0.003 595,029 Percentage of women 15–49 currently
pregnant *  population female 15–49
Management of severe malnutrition
(children)
5.039 8.085 9.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 122,555 Incidence of protein-energy
malnutrition among children under-5
Vitamin  A supplementation in infants
and children 6–59 months
0.077 0.394 0.725 0.001 0.002 0.003 1,118,095 Incidence of vitamin A deficiency
among children 6–59 months
Pneumonia  treatment (children) 0.273 0.502 0.722 0.004 0.007 0.008 462,121 incidence of pneumonia among
children under-5
Zinc  0.057 0.089 0.111 0.000 0.001 0.001 1,242,620 Incidence of nutritional deficiencies
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(ICER), where different levels of the breadth of coverage of
an intervention are mutually exclusive, and including them
in  a stepwise fashion until either the budget is  reached or
the next most cost effective intervention coverage interval
cannot be included without going over budget. Each inter-
vention is covered up to a  5% increment except for the final
intervention included, which may  be partially included.
The steps required for the optimization are detailed below.
Step 1: We first calculate ICERs for each intervention
and 5% coverage level alternative using cumulative costs
and benefits. As is standard in  calculating ICERs, we elim-
inate any alternative that is less effective and more costly
than the next incremental 5% coverage level alternative (to
avoid overestimating the cost-effectiveness of the 5% cov-
erage level alternative). We  then eliminate any alternative
that has a higher ICER than the next incremental 5% cover-
age level alternative. These are considered “dominated” as
more health benefit is achieved with less cost by the next
incremental 5% coverage level alternative. When a  cover-
age level alternative is  removed, the costs and benefits for
the next alternative are calculated incremental to the last
alternative that was not removed from the analysis.4 We
refer to the resulting ICERs as “non-dominated intervention
coverage alternatives”.5
Under scenario 1,  benefits for all interventions are
constant or decreasing with coverage and unit costs are
non-decreasing with coverage, so the ICERs are  generally
known to be non-decreasing with coverage. (ICERs calcu-
lated for scenario 1 are  given in Data Appendix 2, Table 6)
In contrast, under scenario 2, both costs and benefits may
increase with coverage. As  previously discussed, we con-
sider it impractical to  allow ‘gaps’ in  coverage, whereby
certain intermediate coverage groups are  denied access.
Because benefits at higher levels of coverage are weighted
in scenario 2, some incremental increases in coverage
for some interventions may  be  dominated by increases
to higher levels of coverage, with the result that some
incremental coverage increases of 5% are considered dom-
inated and eliminated and therefore are absorbed into
larger incremental increases. For example, it would not
be cost-effective to increase management of serious new-
born infections from 65% to  70% coverage, nor from 70% to
75%, and so on, until reaching 100% coverage and so only
ICERs 0% to 50%, 50% to 55%, 55% to  60%, 60% to 65% and
65–100% for management of serious newborn infections
are included in this step of the optimization. (ICERs calcu-
lated for scenario 2 are given in  Data Appendix 2, Table 7.)
Under scenario 3 cost and benefit functions are assumed
to be linear as the only known points are a  do nothing sce-
nario (with zero cost and zero benefit) and 95% coverage.
(ICERs calculated for scenario 3 are given in  Data Appendix
2, Table 8.)
Step 2: Rank the non-dominated intervention coverage
alternatives by ICER and include these from most to least
cost-effective until the budget is reached or  the next most
4 For details on CEA methods for calculating ICERs see  Drummond et al.,
2015  and Sculpher et al., 2017.
5 Dominated alternatives include both strongly and extendedly (or
weakly) dominated alternatives.
cost-effective non-dominated intervention coverage alter-
native cannot be included without going over the budget.
The budget impact for each incremental decision is the per
patient cost at the incremental coverage level multiplied
by the number of patients the increase would cover. For
example, the budget impact of increasing management of
serious newborn infections from 55% to 60% would be per
patient cost of increasing from 55% to 60% multiplied by
5% of the patient population. The budget impact of increas-
ing from 60% to 100% coverage would be the sum of the
budget impact for each 5% marginal increase within that
range (as incremental per patient costs may  differ for each
5% increment).
Step 3: It  is  likely that there will be a  gap between expen-
diture on the last included non-dominated intervention
coverage alternatives and the budget. We call this gap the
budget underspend. The third and final step is to ensure
this underspend is  spent in a  manner that results in the
greatest possible gains in overall population health. This
step can be broken down into its constituent parts:
• Calculate the budget underspend.
• Eliminate any intervention coverage alternatives for
which the additional cumulative expenditure required to
include them exceeds the budget underspend.
• Re-calculate ICERs for remaining intervention coverage
alternatives (both those that were previously dominated
and those that were not).
• Re-rank remaining non-dominated intervention cover-
age alternatives.
• The algorithm returns to step 1 and is  repeated until the
remaining budget underspend is  less than the expen-
diture required to scale up  any intervention to the
next coverage level alternative (dominated or non-
dominated).
• The final step is  to calculate the ICER of increasing cov-
erage from the current level covered to the next level for
each intervention and partially scale up the intervention
with the lowest from among these ICERs.
Results
Fig. 2 shows the results of the optimization for each
scenario 1) differential coverage levels are allowed; 2) dif-
ferential coverage different coverage levels are  allowed and
differential equity weights are applied to  the benefits of
coverage; and 3) interventions are either provided at 95%
coverage or not  at all.
When differential coverage levels are allowed without
equity weights (scenario 1) 14 interventions are covered:
seven are fully covered at 100% (community newborn
care package, tetanus toxoid, normal delivery by a  skilled
attendant, insecticide treated nets (ITN), intermittent pre-
sumptive treatment in  pregnancy (IPTP), case management
of malaria with artemisinin-based combination therapy
(ACT) and treatment of new smear-positive TB  cases only
under DOTS) and seven at varying lower coverage levels
(treatment of syphilis at 60%, management of maternal sep-
sis at 65%, management of serious newborn infections at
75%, measles rubella vaccine at 85%, vitamin A supplemen-
tation in pregnant women at 50%, pneumonia treatment
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Fig. 2. Coverage levels for each intervention.
(children) at 75% and zinc at 70%). The last non-dominated
intervention coverage alternative included in its entirety
is management of maternal sepsis at 65% with an ICER
of $1,153 (US 2015). There is a  budget underspend of
$236,642, and the next most cost-effective non-dominated
intervention coverage alternative is pneumonia treatment
(children) at 75%, so that is scaled up until the budget is
exhausted (i.e., to 74.62%).
When differential equity weights are applied to the ben-
efits of coverage (scenario 2) 13 interventions are included
and there is less variation in  the levels at which they are
covered: ten are  fully covered at 100% (the same seven
interventions as in scenario one plus management of seri-
ous newborn infections, measles rubella vaccine and zinc)
and the remaining three are included at 65% (screening
and treatment of syphilis), 58% (management of maternal
sepsis) and 75% (pneumonia treatment in children). This
is because applying differential weights to benefits for the
ultimate and penultimate deciles of covered patients has
the effect of reducing the ICERs for increasing coverage to
these groups, which makes expanding coverage to  these
groups more appealing than covering other interventions
at lower levels. For example, covering vitamin A supple-
mentation in pregnant women at 50% has an ICER of $976.
Without equity weights, this is more cost-effective than
covering measles rubella vaccine at 85% or any higher level,
and indeed under scenario 1 measles rubella vaccine is cov-
ered at 85% with an ICER of $1,097. However, when equity
weights are applied, expanding measles rubella vaccine
beyond 85% is more cost-effective than providing vitamin A
supplementation at 50%. Similarly, once equity weights are
applied, coverage of management of maternal sepsis and
pneumonia treatment (children) are reduced, while cover-
age of zinc and management of serious newborn infections
are expanded. The marginal intervention in this scenario,
management of maternal sepsis, has an equity weighted
ICER of $900.
In the all or  nothing scenario 12 of the 16 interven-
tions are  included at 95% apart from zinc as the remaining
budget is  only enough to include it at 31%. This includes
all seven of the interventions covered at 100% in  sce-
nario 1.  Compared to scenario 1, coverage increases to
95% for screening and treatment of syphilis, management
of serious newborn infections, measles rubella vaccine
and pneumonia treatment (children). Two interventions
that were included in  scenario 1 are not included in this
scenario: management of maternal sepsis and vitamin A
supplementation in  pregnant women. No coverage level for
either of these interventions was particularly cost-effective
in scenario 1 (i.e. not among top intervention coverage
alternatives). Moreover, the costs of providing these inter-
ventions increase rapidly with coverage level, in  particular
for vitamin A supplementation.
Table 2 presents the DALYs averted by each interven-
tion given the level of coverage it is included at and the total
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Community newborn care package 108 100% 595 833 58  100% 595 833 80 95% 565 714
Tetanus toxoid 686 100% 9,925 13,895 224 100% 9,925 13,895 163 95% 9,429 11,910
Screening and treatment of syphilis 776 60% 321 321 776 60% 321 321 954 95% 509 643
Normal  delivery by a skilled
attendant
674 100% 4,998 6,998 271 100% 4,998 6,998 358 95% 4,748 5,998
Management of maternal sepsis 1,153 65% 82 82 900 58% 70 70
Management of serious newborn
infections
1,072 75% 46 46 684 100% 62 87  555 95% 59  74
Measles rubella vaccine 1,097 85% 4,192 4,373 552 100% 4,661 5,912 380 95% 4,517 5,336
Insecticide-treated bed  nets (ITN) 387 100% 10,706 13,903 210 100% 10,706 13,903 269 95% 10,328 12,391
Intermittent presumptive
treatment in pregnancy (IPTP)
1,077 100% 141 189 355 100% 141 189 306 95% 135 166
Case  management of malaria with
artemisinin-based combination
therapy (ACT)
44 100% 154,460 205,147 15  100% 154,460 205,147 17 95% 148,346 180,692
Treatment of new smear-positive
TB cases only under DOTS
175 100% 15,402 21,563 64  100% 15,402 21,563 70 95% 14,632 18,482
Vitamin A supplementation in
pregnant women
976 50% 863 863
Management of severe
malnutrition (children)
Vitamin A supplementation in
infants and children 6–59
months
Pneumonia treatment (children) 1,164 75% 3,035 3,035 827 65% 2,643 2,643 721 95% 3,863 4,880
Zinc  1,092 70% 870 870 708 100% 1,243 1,740 961 31% 385 486
Total  205,636 272,117 205,227 273,300 197,516 241,771
Maximum ICER 1,164 900 961
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the included interventions is highest when coverage levels
are allowed to vary (i.e., scenario 1: 205,636 DALYs averted)
compared to when equity weights are applied (i.e., scenario
2: 205,227) or when interventions decisions are made on
the basis of including either at 95% or not at all (i.e.,  scenario
3: 197,516 DALYs averted). Using equity weights, however,
changes the optimal package so that fewer interventions
are included overall, but among those more are included
at 100%. The optimal package where benefits are equity
weighted averts more equity weighted DALYs (273,300)
than the optimal package where benefits are  not equity
weighted (which averts 272,117 equity weighted DALYs),
and both avert more equity weighted DALYs than the pack-
age where interventions are either included at 95% or not
at all (241,771).
In scenario 1 where coverage levels are allowed to vary
(but equity weights are not used) 14 interventions of the
16 are included. The cost-effectiveness ratio of the last
included intervention, pneumonia treatment (children) at
nearly 75%, is $1,164 (2015 US), and so this represents the
marginal productivity of the discretionary budget.
Discussion
This illustrative example shows how policy makers can
be provided with information on where the greatest health
gains can be achieved from available coverage options and
how this can be traded-off with gains in  equity. The first
scenario assumes that health gains are valued equally irre-
spective of characteristics of the beneficiaries. However,
policy makers might value health gains of underserved
rural/remote populations more highly. One option is  for the
implications of this to be explored in a  deliberative man-
ner when the analysis is being translated into practice, e.g.,
as was done for the 2017–2022 Malawi Essential Health
Package (Ochalek et al., 2018a). As an alternative, Scenario
2 incorporates equity weights explicitly by  allowing w(.) to
vary.
Health benefits packages usually promise a  set of inter-
ventions for the full population, although these are often
only partially available in practice. The promise of full cov-
erage is aligned with the definition of UHC; however, if
implicit rationing is taking place (e.g., where the least well
off are less able to secure access to care than the most
well off) the package is not in  reality provided at full cov-
erage. The possible equity gains to be had from directing
expenditure toward improving coverage of interventions
as opposed to  expanding the package can now be quanti-
fied, making this trade-off explicit.
Although the method could in  principle be used to
develop a benefits package from a  zero base, this illus-
trative example addresses a specific, not unusual, decision
context where an amount of money is made available to
be allocated for discretionary funding of a  limited set of
possible interventions. This method is therefore appropri-
ate for example when a  budget is  set aside for allocating
resources within a  disease-specific budget silo. However,
it is important to  note that  this use of a  dedicated bud-
get will not in general be optimal and can lead  to health
and welfare losses overall. Understanding of this issue was
reflected in the interest in  sector wide approaches (SWAps)
introduced in the 1990s, which provided a mechanism for
coordinating funding from disparate sources and allocat-
ing resources centrally. However, in practice, appropriate
data for all interventions at every possible coverage level is
unlikely to exist, and the administrative complexity would
in any case be daunting, so the limited optimization we
present reflects the usual context in which coverage deci-
sions are made.
Estimates of the marginal productivity of the health care
systems in the AFR-E region range from $59 to $5,014 (2015
US) per DALY averted (Ochalek et al., 2018b). Comparisons
between these estimates and the $1,164 cost-effectiveness
of the last included intervention in our illustrative exam-
ple (the marginal productivity of the discretionary budget)
are difficult for a  number of reasons. Whether the marginal
productivity of the discretionary budget is  higher or lower
than a  plausible empirical estimate of the marginal pro-
ductivity of the wider health care system depends upon
the representativeness of the interventions that  the dis-
cretionary budget may  be spent on compared to the
interventions funded within the wider health care system.
If these 16 interventions are more (less) cost-effective than
the interventions funded within the wider health care sys-
tem the marginal productivity of the discretionary budget
will be higher (lower) as represented by a  lower (higher)
cost per DALY averted than that of the wider health care
system.
There is no consideration of service quality variations,
and in practice we are assuming that all coverage is equally
effective. Ineffective coverage (for  example, use of vaccines
rendered ineffective due to  lack of refrigeration) lies out-
side the definition of UHC and should be considered a  type
of inefficiency. We  further assume under Scenario 1 that
for most treatments the incremental health gains secured
are equal for all recipients (or exhibit modest reductions
as coverage increases). In practice there may  be consider-
able variations in health gains between social groups, for
example if the treatment under consideration has differ-
ent treatment ‘comparators’ in rural and urban areas. Such
data is not currently available. However, from a method-
ological perspective, the possibility of health gains varying
systematically according to levels of disadvantage is equiv-
alent to the adoption of equity weights under Scenario 2, so
is readily accommodated if relevant data become available.
More generally, as with most such applications, this
illustration is replete with uncertainty. In principle the
model could be extended by attaching probability distri-
butions to  the parameters used, and undertaking stochastic
modelling using approaches such as Monte-Carlo simula-
tion. Whilst this would undoubtedly yield valuable further
information, it is not clear to what extent it would further
assist decision-makers. It  is  likely that – in practice – most
decision-makers would want to focus on a small number
of crucial choices relating to  treatments for which the cost-
effectiveness is at a  critical level, the reliability of the data
is questionable, there are additional contextual factors to
consider, or the budget impact is high. These are legitimate
influences on decisions. The role of the analysis is  to  inform
the decision in  a  transparent, rigorous and systematic way,
and not to  determine the outcome.
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Conclusion
This paper has offered an operational approach towards
the optimal design of the discretionary part of a UHC ben-
efits package. It is based on a theoretical mathematical
programme that seeks to reconcile the concepts of depth
and breadth coverage, as expressed in  the WHO  universal
health coverage ‘cube’. We  note that in practice population
coverage is usually less than 100%, even in mature systems
of UHC, and that this is  likely to arise on  the demand side
because of user charges and other barriers to  access, and on
the supply side due to the relatively high costs of providing
services for remote or disadvantaged populations.
In order to make the analysis tractable, we have cho-
sen to remove the possibility of imposing user charges, and
instead focus on the common supply-side policy problem
of the trade-off between breadth and depth of coverage.
We  use WHO-CHOICE data to  demonstrate how an optimal
solution can be secured. With a notional $15 million budget
available, it indicates that 205,636 DALYs could  be averted
compared to the 197,516 DALYs averted if decision-makers
insist that (almost) full coverage should be secured for all
interventions in a  necessarily narrower package. We  show
the opportunity cost (in the form of lost DALYs averted) of
choosing to expand levels of population coverage (breadth
of coverage) at the expense of the range of treatments
offered (depth of coverage), and how – if desired – equity
weights can be introduced into the optimization.
The paper adapts the principles of conventional cost-
effectiveness analysis to situations in  which estimates of
both costs and benefits may  vary depending on the levels of
population coverage achieved. Therefore the analysis suf-
fers from many of the acknowledged limitations of many
CEA studies. In common with usual CEA practice, the inter-
ventions are considered to  be independent of each other,
and we do not allow for the possibility of economies of
scope. This issue is recognized as being an important limi-
tation of conventional CEA, and may  be one of the reasons
why unit costs are lower in  urban centres, particularly for
hospital-based services. Methodologies to accommodate
economies of scope within CEA are beginning to  emerge,
and should in principle be incorporated into benefit pack-
age design (Hauck et al., 2019). However, they are at an
early stage of development. Finally, we  consider just one
period, and do not examine the multiperiod implications
of  coverage decisions (apart from the future health bene-
fits attained). It may  well be the case that future research
into some of these limitations will be valuable, but for the
current paper we choose to  remain consistent with conven-
tional CEA practice, apart from allowing costs and benefits
to vary according to  levels of coverage.
A  more immediate limitation in  our view is the general
lack of persuasive cost-effectiveness data relating to cov-
erage levels and how they correspond to levels of wealth.
We opportunistically took  advantage of WHO-CHOICE cal-
culations to demonstrate the methods needed to  assess
optimal coverage levels. The production of these data is a
big step forward. However, even the WHO  data are broad
estimates, the methodology on which the cost functions are
based is not transparent, and they are not  country-specific.
Moreover, in practical decision-making situations, such
data will be  almost entirely lacking for many interventions
and country settings. Implicitly, the high costs of reaching
disadvantaged populations are likely to be an important
reason for the low levels of coverage found in  many coun-
tries, and yet we are not aware of many datasets that
quantify unit cost variations, which would allow decision-
makers to make informed decisions about the trade-off
between breadth and depth of coverage. We see the provi-
sion of data on variations in unit costs and health benefits at
the country level as a  priority for future empirical research
in this area. Whilst in many respects daunting, the provi-
sion of such data may be a feasible and relatively low-cost
extension of conventional CEA studies, and we recommend
that sponsors of such research give serious consideration to
funding disaggregated data that would inform the pursuit
of equity in health care.
We  hope that – by illustrating how realistic coverage
decisions could in principle be made – we can stimulate
more research into the data and analytic methods neces-
sary to inform such decisions. The policy choice of whether
or not to tolerate some element of ‘unmet need’ in a system
of UHC is an agonizing one, with profound consequences
for those who  are denied treatment. However, we have
shown on the other hand that insistence on pursuing high
population coverage levels without regard to the implica-
tions for the size of the benefits package also has serious
opportunity costs, in the form of the health benefits from
treatments foregone because they could not  be  included
in  the benefits package. We  are  under no illusions about
the challenges raised by seeking to apply analytic meth-
ods in this area. But the methods described do offer the
opportunity to  help decision-makers become more aware
of the structure of the coverage problem they confront, the
data that are needed to inform analytic models, and the
population health consequences of their coverage choices.
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Germany.
Drummond, M.F., Sculpher, M.J., Claxton, K., Stoddart, G.L., Torrance,
G.W., 2015. Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care
Programmes, Retrieved from https://books.google.com/
books?hl=en&lr=&id=yzZSCwAAQBAJ&pgis=1.
Edejer, T.T.-T., Aikins, M.,  Black, R., Wolfson, L., Hutubessy, R., Evans, D.B.,
2005. Cost effectiveness analysis of strategies for child health in
developing countries. BMJ  331 (7526), 1177,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38652.550278.7C.
Glassman, A., Giedion, U., Smith, P.C., 2017. What’s In, What’s Out:
Designing Benefits for Universal Health Coverage, Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/book/whats-in-whats-out/.
Hauck, K., Morton, A., Chalkidou, K., Chi, Y.-L., Culyer, A., Levin, C., et al.,
2019. How can we evaluate the cost-effectiveness of health system
strengthening? A typology and illustrations. Soc. Sci. Med. 1982
(220),  141–149, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.10.030.
Jamison, D.T., Summers, L.H., Alleyne, G.,  Arrow, K.J., Berkley, S.,
Binagwaho, A., Yamey, G., 2013. Global health 2035: a world
converging within a generation. Lancet 382 (9908), 1898–1955,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62105-4.
Morel, C.M., Lauer, J.A., Evans, D.B.,  2005. Cost effectiveness analysis of
strategies to combat malaria in developing countries. BMJ  331
(7528),  1299, http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38639.702384.AE.
Moreno-Serra, R., Smith, P.C., 2015. Broader health coverage is  good for
the nation’s health: evidence from country level panel data. J.  R. Stat.
Soc. Ser. A Stat. Soc. 178 (1), 101–124,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12048.
Ng,  M., Fullman, N., Dieleman, J.L., Flaxman, A.D., Murray, C.J.L., Lim, S.S.,
2014. Effective coverage: a  metric for monitoring Universal Health
Coverage. PLoS Med. 11 (9), e1001730,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001730.
Nicholson, D., Yates, R., Warburton, W.,  Fontana, G., 2015. Delivering
Universal Health Coverage - a  Guide for Policymakers: Report of the
WISH Universal Health Coverage Forum 2015, Retrieved from
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/institute-of-
global-health-innovation/public/Universal-health-coverage.pdf.
Ochalek, J., Lomas, J., Claxton, K.,  2018a. Estimating health opportunity
costs in low-income and middle-income countries: a novel approach
and  evidence from cross-country data.  BMJ  Glob. Health 3 (6),
e000964, http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000964.
Ochalek, J., Revill, P., Manthalu, G., McGuire, F., Nkhoma, D., Rollinger, A.,
et al., 2018b. Supporting the development of a health benefits
package in Malawi. BMJ  Glob. Health.
Sculpher, M.J., Revill, P.,  Ochalek, J., Claxton, K., 2017. How Much health
for the money? Using cost-effectiveness analysis to support benefits
plan decisions. In: Glassman, A., Giedion, U., Smith, P.C. (Eds.),
What’s In What’s Out: Designing Benefits for Universal Health
Coverage. Center for Global Development, Washington D.C.
Smith, P.C., 2005. User  charges and priority setting in health care:
balancing equity and efficiency. J.  Health Econ. 24 (5), 1018–1029,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.JHEALECO.2005.01.003.
Smith, P.C., 2013. Incorporating financial protection into decision rules
for publicly financed healthcare treatments. Health Econ. (United
Kingdom) 22 (2), 180–193, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hec.2774.
Somanathan, A., Tandon, A., Lan  Dao, H., Hurt, K.L., Fuenzalida-Puel, H.L.,
2014. Moving Toward Universal Coverage of Social Health Insurance




Tan-Torres Edejer, T., Baltussen, R., Adam, T., Hutubessy, R.,  Acharya, A.,
Evans, D., Murray, C., 2003. Making Choices in Health: WHO  Guide to







Nations, 2013. 67/81. Global Health and Foreign Policy, Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/81.
Wagstaff, A., Doorslaer, Evan., 2003. Catastrophe and impoverishment in
paying for health care: with applications to  Vietnam 1993-1998.
Health Econ. 12 (11), 921–933, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hec.776.
WHO, 2010. Health Systems Financing: the Path to  Universal Coverage.
WHO, Geneva.
WHO, 2014a. AFR E: Cost Effectiveness Results for Childhood Diseases.
WHO, Retrieved from
https://www.who.int/choice/results/u5 afre/en/.
WHO, 2014b. AFR E: cost effectiveness results for malaria. In: Cost
Effectiveness and Strategic Planning (WHO-CHOICE), Retrieved from
https://www.who.int/choice/results/mal afre/en/.
WHO, 2014c. AFR E:  Cost Effectiveness Results for Tuberculosis. WHO,
Retrieved from https://www.who.int/choice/results/tb afre/en/.
WHO, 2014d. AFRO E: cost  effectiveness results for maternal and
neonatal health. In: Cost Effectiveness and Strategic Planning
(WHO-CHOICE), Retrieved from
https://www.who.int/choice/results/mnh afroe/en/.
WHO, 2015. Universal Coverage -  Three Dimensions, Retrieved January
4,  2019, from WHO  website
https://www.who.int/health financing/strategy/dimensions/en/.
WHO, 2017. SDG 3: Ensure Healthy Lives and Promote Wellbeing for All
at  All  Ages, Retrieved February 6,  2019, from WHO website
https://www.who.int/sdg/targets/en/.
WHO, 2018. Universal Health Coverage, Retrieved February 6,  2019, from
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal health coverage/en/.
World Bank Group, 2019. Domestic General Government Health Expen-
diture Per Capita (Current US$), Data, Retrieved February 4,  2019, from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.GHED.PC.CD?view=chart.
World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, 2017. Coverage,
Access and Financial Protection in Europe: a  Regional Overview.
WHO, Copenhagen.
Further reading
Coinnews Media Group LLC, 2018. US Inflation Calculator, Retrieved
January 30, 2019, from https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/.
Kumaranayake, L., 2000. The real and the nominal? Making inflationary
adjustments to  cost and other economic data. Health Policy Plan. 15
(2), 230–234, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/heapol/15.2.230.
White, M.T., Conteh, L., Cibulskis, R., Ghani, A.C., 2011. Costs and
cost-effectiveness of malaria control interventions - a systematic
review.  Malar. J. 10 (1), 337,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1475-2875-10-337.
